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Even though Jürgen Streeck himself compares his portrayal of Hussein Chmeis to 
a pointillist painting (p. 378), it was an analogy with James Joyce’s Ulysses that first 
came to mind as I finished reading his book. Streeck follows Chmeis, the owner of 
a car repair shop in Austin, Texas, for eleven consecutive hours (i. e. his entire work-
day) with his camera and, over the following years, spends 7,000–8,000 hours ana-
lysing the material thus obtained, paying close attention to each and every means 
Hussein Chmeis uses to communicate with his environment: gesturing, speak-
ing, looking, pointing or even walking. Self-Making Man is, in a certain sense then, 
a remarkable attempt to achieve what Roland Barthes has called mathesis singula-
ris: Mr. Chmeis — just like Joyce’s Leopold Bloom — is a single individual, situated 
in a particular time and in a particular place, but at the same time he is an “Every-
man”, an incarnation of human communication in general. As Streeck himself puts 
it: “This book has the double ambition of illuminating an individual person and his 
idiosyncrasies and the generic, socially and culturally shared practices this person 
enacts” (p. XXV). Streeck’s “micro-ethnographic” methodology (p. XXV) enables him 
to move constantly between the particular and the general, between Hussein’s “idio-
syncrasies” and broader theoretical considerations, the guiding idea of the book be-
ing that of self-making or auto-poiesis: the ongoing individuation of a human being 
who “continuously fashions a viable communicative self ” (p. XXII) from his cultural 
background, as well as from his intersubjective communicative interactions. 
At first reading, it seems that the book is not without a certain resemblance to 
ancient treatises on rhetorical devices. The human body is thus duly divided into dif-
ferent semiotic spheres, and the various activities of the hands, eyes, and feet are 
examined. The resemblance is, however, only a formal one. First of all, the division 
in question is made for analytical purposes only: the individual is conceived of as 
a dynamic unity, a locus of different communicative practices that cannot be sepa-
rated from one another. Second, Hussein’s communicative activities are being stud-
ied as just so many ways of interacting with others and of handling the surrounding 
 Umwelt: the stress is thus put on doing things, on making sense, on interaction with 
others.
Streeck’s book contains literally hundreds of examples illustrating the subtleties 
of human communicative activities. I will, of course, mention only a small selection 
of these here. Take, for example, the analysis of Hussein’s walking. Far from being 
a mere means of getting from place to place, walking and its different modalities 
represent an important element of what Streeck calls “practices”, that is, embodied 
methods for “performing social actions” (p. 7): drawing on a beautiful passage from 
one of Balzac’s lesser known texts, La théorie de la démarche (quoted at length on p. 10), 
Streeck envisages the possibility of elaborating a social “physiognomy” of walking, 
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considered to be a communicative behaviour or “an important conveyor of social in-
formation” (p. 17). Hussein’s way of walking changes according to the situation, from 
a neutral “unmarked gait” (p. 13) to the various modulations in his ways of moving 
around as he interacts with others or, as Streeck puts it, “attends to his visibility for 
others” (p. 13). Under certain circumstances, this “intercorporeality in motion” (p. 54) 
may even acquire very complex features that bring it surprisingly close to dancing.
No less remarkable is Streeck’s analysis of gaze. In general terms, mutual gaze 
is interpreted as a “minimal social contract”, signifying a mutual recognition of the 
interactants rather than a mere display of attention (p. 70). This, however, is only 
the roughest outline of things: the vision-based activities in which Hussein engages 
during his workday are considerably more complex and call for a much more subtle 
conceptual distinction to be made between various modes of visual interaction. As 
Streeck justly complains, the general notion of gaze “obscures the variations that oc-
cur in the ways humans look at the world (and each other) and that are captured by 
the rich vocabulary for ocular actions in our everyday languages” (p. 78). Thus, gaze is 
not only the vehicle of the “social contract” in face-to-face interactions (and of break-
ing that contract when one of the interlocutors turns away), but also of joint attention 
and other modalities of intersubjective behaviour. 
Even more complex, perhaps, is the activity of pointing and showing, moving us 
into the realm of manual communication, Streeck’s principal field of scientific inter-
est for many years. The various forms of Hussein’s pointing gestures are subjected to 
detailed analysis. Streeck’s principal idea (already put forward in many of his previ-
ous works) seems to be that the referencing based on pointing gestures is an impor-
tant element of constructing a common Umwelt, of “sharing perceptual experience 
and information” (p. 162); as such, they require what Streeck terms “local knowledge, 
or even layers of knowledge, including normative ontologies of what is there to be 
seen in the first place” (p. 126). However elementary and simple it may look, the activ-
ity of pointing may acquire rather complicated modalities, not only “spotlighting”, 
i.e. disambiguating certain objects or “raising the figure from the ground” (p. 135), 
but also “construal”, that is, a way of representing the object in question, showing it 
“as something” (p. 141). It may also become a sign of authority: “Pointing gestures are 
too narrowly conceived as acts geared only toward directing attention; often, they 
are made when the speaker, rather, directs someone to do something” (p. 162). Show-
ing, on the other hand, is a more general form of interaction whose purpose is not 
only to direct the attention (as is the case of pointing), but, rather, to teach and ex-
plain — “pedagogy”, as Streeck calls it (p. 202). Showing is a way of conceptualising 
the world we live in and especially of making this conceptualisation accessible to 
others. Of particular interest is the fact that showing is not limited — as one might 
expect — solely to visible things in that world, but is capable of encoding, in visual 
form, even the qualities perceived by senses other than that of sight: Streeck gives 
several examples of “sensory transformation” or “transmodality” (with an interest-
ing reference to Gilles Deleuze’s book on Francis Bacon), that is, the ability of ges-
tures to transpose sensory experience from one modality to another (p. 177). Gesture, 
therefore, appears to be a trans-sensory phenomenon — providing a good illustra-




the world is not based on a mere juxtaposition of different perceptive modalities but 
rather on the intertwining of those modalities, on an interpenetration that enables 
the body to endow the world with meaning.
Not surprisingly, a large section is devoted to Hussein Chmeis’ gesticulations. The 
section opens with a minute analysis of a forty-second sequence of dialogue between 
Hussein and Streeck himself. In it, Streeck demonstrates that while pointing and 
showing, in most cases, seem to have a relatively clear communicative function, “the 
gestures in this turn are not so obviously ‘functional’, although each one demonstra-
bly furnishes some experienced structure and perceived meaning to the interaction” 
(p. 215). In some cases, the relation between a particular gesture and the “information” 
it conveys is not devoid of opacity. A good example of this is Hussein’s “slicing” or 
“cutting” gesture (a rapid downward movement made with the hand held in a palm-
vertical position): Streeck asserts that all instances of this gesture are connected with 
some kind of negation, but admits also a possibility — quite a plausible one, in fact — 
that “the cutting gesture marks a dividing or separating of what is and what is not the 
case, of true and false, instead of signifying negative polarity, as grammatical forms 
of negation do” (p. 275–276). The opacity of gesticulation has obviously to do with the 
fact that this form of gesturing is prone to idiosyncrasy and individual variation; 
however, this does not mean that it is impossible to present a general theory of the 
phenomenon of gesturing. For example, on pp. 215–218, the reader finds a very useful 
overview of the general features of gesticulation, based on the forty-second sequence 
just mentioned. Streeck denies — like Merleau-Ponty before him — any species of 
body/mind dualism that might lead us to believe that gesturing is in any way a cor-
poreal representation of mental states. As Streeck succinctly puts it: “Gestures are 
cognitions, not the outer signs of ‘inner’ cognitions” (284). And later on: “If we are 
truly interested in understanding the nature and logic of spontaneous gesturing, we 
gain little by thinking of them as expressions of a speaker’s thoughts” (p. 294). In 
other words, gesturing is not an instrument for expressing the “inner” states of mind 
of a self-conscious subject, but rather “a subjectless activity, uncontrolled by any en-
tity other than the living body itself ” (p. 295). This refusal of duality is not without 
precedent, but the great advantage of Streeck’s book is that his approach is always 
grounded in abundant empirical data and example: indeed, Merleau-Ponty scholars, 
often exasperated by the abstract and ambiguous character of his reflexions on ges-
ture, language and corporeality, would gain much by reading Self-Making Man. 
The wonderful chapter on Hussein’s way of speaking is worth brief mention. 
When it comes to speaking, Hussein is not what we would call a “standard” subject, 
English not being his mother tongue. But this is not where our interest lies here. Hus-
sein’s speech, grammatically “imperfect” as it may be, is treated precisely as a corpo-
real activity (p. 299), with attention therefore being paid to such aspects as rhythm 
and intonation, as well as to what Streeck calls the “poetics” or “rhetorical range” of 
Hussein’s language (p. 318). Streeck discovers and describes the remarkable poetic 
devices Hussein uses — most likely unwittingly — to enhance his message: different 
kinds of parallelisms, such as alliteration, repetition etc. In this perspective, Hussein 
appears to be a true “oral poet”, whose linguistic performance, in certain respects, 
is compared to freestyle rap (p. 322). In Streeck’s own words: “Hussein, I believe, at 
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times betrays a poet’s tuning to the music of language, as he builds engaging lingua 
franca narratives and shows a public speaker’s persuasion skills at the same time” 
(p. 322). 
Instead of further summarizing Streeck’s illuminating book, I will conclude with 
a few remarks whose personal character I will not attempt to hide. First of all, if 
Streeck stresses the poetic qualities of Hussein’s language, it is also worth noting 
that there is an undeniable literary or poetic undertone in his own writing. This is 
particularly apparent in the titles of some of the chapters (Crazy Days, p. 319; The 
Story of the Red Capri, p. 340), or in unexpected metaphorical constructions (com-
parison of the car repair shop to a clinic, p. 364). There is also what Roland Barthes has 
called a “tender attention to details”; for example when Hussein is having his lunch, 
not only do we learn that he is eating (which is obvious), but we are told what he is 
eating: “He has warmed a pita bread in a microwave and is eating it with vegetables 
and hummus, seated on a desk in the garage” (p. 223). This literary dimension makes 
Self-Making Man not only an engaging treatise on human communication, but also an 
enjoyable read in the most common sense of the word. 
Equally important is the fact that there is an underlying philosophy in Streeck’s 
book that amounts to much more than the simple use of philosophical references. 
Because Streeck studies human communication and interaction in the natural envi-
ronment (in different natural ecologies, as he calls it) and not under laboratory condi-
tions, he is able to develop a true theory of the body and of its way of inhabiting the 
world: gesture, one of the most complex and most mysterious means of establishing 
the relationship between the body and its Umwelt, “is grounded in the body’s indig-
enous position in the world, its life form: its forward-looking attitude toward the 
world, its relatedness to objects, obstacles, and forces” (p. 276). In the conclusion, this 
philosophy of the body inhabiting the world and creating Umwelten through various 
communicative practices (p. 379) is stated even more clearly: the individual actor’s 
interaction with his environment “brings into relief the always open-ended relation-
ship between practice/habit/routine and contingent situation, between ‘sediment’ 
and ‘spontaneity’, between repetition and change” (p. 284). Or, in other words, the 
human body and human communication are inseparable from practices that “reside 
in individual human bodies, who acquire the majority of them from ‘the society’ and 
‘the culture’ by participating in their public commerce, but adapt them and blend 
them with ‘self-made’ practices, routinized solutions to recurrent tasks and circum-
stances in the life-world, and perhaps infused with a personal style (signature)” 
(p. 67–68). This is precisely what I propose to call — following, but also distorting Ro-
land Barthes’ expression — mathesis singularis: the study of an individual actor’s com-
municative behaviour which permits us to find a balance between the idiosyncratic 
and the general, but also — and this is one of the great merits of Streeck’s study — to 
ground the often rather abstract philosophical theories it draws upon in the realm 
of the concrete, for Streeck literally shows us how the body inhabits the world, what 
corporeal means it uses to build meaning upon it, to conceptualise it, to share it with 
others. The dynamic of the book, as I have already stated, rests in its capacity to pass 





More generally speaking, this philosophy of the body is also a philosophy of life. 
After all, it is no accident that the word “life” appears in the subtitle of the book. The 
word, if I am not mistaken, seems to be endowed with several meanings. First of all, 
there is what might be called a “current” meaning: the book focuses on one workday 
in the “ordinary life” of a car repair shop owner. But then there is also a philosophical 
meaning: “(…) to understand the body and give it its proper place in our social theo-
ries, we must understand it as life and recognize in its communicative movements 
the logic that is characteristic of the self-organization of all life and movement. (…) 
Gesticulation cannot be described and explained within the traditional categories of 
subject, agent, and communicative intent, for the one who makes gestures is an au-
tonomous, unsupervised living body, making sense of the oncoming world by moving 
toward it, grasping it, taking hold of it (…)” (p. 386). Briefly, the living body, as Streeck 
conceives of it, is situated at the crossroads between cultural habitus and spontane-
ity, between learned or culturally acquired behaviour and idiosyncratic “signature”, 
between the singular and the general. But there is, I believe, also a third meaning of 
“life”, perhaps not as explicit, but equally important: a poetic one. Apart from being 
a book on human communication and interaction, Self-Making Man is a moving trib-
ute to life in all its mystery and wonder, condensed into the communicative activities 
of one particular human being on one particular day, and my own personal acquain-
tance with the author, if I may say so, gives me reason to believe that stressing this 
third meaning is by no means an over-interpretation.
Self-Making Man is, in every way, an exceptional book. Not only because of its un-
paralleled richness and its analytic rigour combined with vivid imagination. One is 
tempted to quote the poet and say that it leaves the reader “a sadder and a wiser man”. 
Wiser, because many aspects of human communication become, thanks to Streeck’s 
patient analyses, significantly less opaque. Sadder, because the reader realizes all the 
more acutely that this communication with all its complexity will forever remain 
a mystery. But is this, after all, a reason for sadness? 
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